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proper grounds for which evidence of
subsequent conduct should be admitted.
Id.
Finally, the Wilson court was careful to
reconcile its holding with the federal rule
on subsequent remedial measures. The
federal rule reasonably restricts the admissibility of such evidence to those situations where needed; that is, "when offered for another purpose such as providing ownership, control or feasibility
of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment." Fed. R. Evid.
407. However, the court pointed outthat
the advisory committee's note to Federal
Rule 407 expressly lists "existence of
duty" as a valid basis for admitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures.
Wilson, 317 Md. at 297 n.8, 563 A.2d 405
n.8. Thus, the court restated the principle that evidence of subsequent conduct should not be received as an admission of negligence or liability, but that the
standard of care exception is Maryland
law.ld. at 300-01, 563 A.2d at 400.
In Wilson, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that evidence of prior and
subsequent hospital practices were relevant and admissible to prove the alleged
breach ofthe applicable standard ofcare.
In addition, the court provided a test to
determine admissibility of such prior
evidence. However, the danger inherent
in following the Wilson standard is that
the allowability of prior or subsequent
evidence could provide indirect proof of
causation, or in effect, the exception
could "swallow the [general] rule" prohibiting the admission of such evidence.
Id. at 300,563 A.2d at 400 (quoting 5 L.
McLain, Maryland Practice: Maryland
Evidence § 407.1 (1987, 1989 Supp.».
Consequently, to allow both prior and
subsequent evidence might make such
evidence tantamount to an admission of
negligence, which the court of appeals
has expressly precluded.
-Stephen E. Cohill

Andresen v. Andresen: MARYlAND
COURTS NOT PERMITfED TO
REDETERMINE MARITAL PROPERlY
MORE THAN 30 DAYS AFfER FINAL
DIVORCE DECREE
In Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380,
564 A.2d 399 (1989), the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered the power
of a court to modify a 1981 divorce decree, which would have allowed a former
spouse to share her former husband's
military pension. The court held that the
petitioner had not established any
grounds upon which the trial court's
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final judgment could have been
reexamined.ld. at 391, 564 A.2d at 405.
The court reasoned that there was no
authority under Maryland law which allowed a court to redetermine marital
property more than thirty days after the
decree became final except in cases of
fraud, mistake, irregularity or clerical
errors.ld. at 387,564 A.2d at 403. Thus,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the trial court's ruling.
Ruth and Ralph Andresen were divorced in Maryland on November 13,
1981. The divorce decree provided for
alimony and payment of attorney's fees
but did not include sharing Mr. Andresen's military pension benefits, which at
that time could not have been subjected
to division upon divorce according to
federal law.
On March 12, 1986, Ms. Andresen filed
a motion in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County to modify the 1981
divorce decree to allow her to share Mr.
Andresen's military pension. Because
Ms. Andresen's motion failed to specify
the procedural mechanism by which a
court could reopen the four-year-old
divorce decree, Mr. Andresen's motion
to dismiss was granted. Ms. Andresen
appealed, and the Court of Appeals of
Maryland granted certiorari prior to a
decision by the intermediate appellate
court to consider whether Mr. Andresen's motion to dismiss was properly
granted. On appeal, Ms. Andresen argued that the changes in the law constituted sufficient justification to reopen
the enrolled divorce decree to allow
sharing of Mr. Andresen's military pension benefits. Id. at 383, 564 A.2d at 401.
The court of appeals began its discussion of the applicable law by reviewing
the changes in federal law. "On June 26,
1981, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that, as matter of federal law, courts
could not subject military retirement pay
to division upon divorce." Id. at 382,564
A.2d at 400 (citing McCarty v. McCarty,
453 U.S. 210 (1981». After the Andresen's divorce became final in 1981, federal statutory law changed thereby allowing courts to consider military pensions
as marital assets for distribution in divorce proceedings.ld. In response to the
McCarty deCision, Congress enacted the
Uniformed Services Former Spouses'
Protection Act (USFSPA) on September
8, 1982, effective February 1, 1983. The
Act was codified in pertinent part as 10
U.S.CA. § 1408 (c) (1). The USFSPA provided:
Subject to the limitations of this

section, a court may treat disposable
retired or retainer pay payable to a
[service] member for pay periods
beginning after June 25, 1981, either as property solely of the member or as property of the member
and his spouse in accordance with
the law of the jurisdiction of such
court.
317 Md. at 383, 564 A.2d at 401.
The court noted that the purpose of
the USFSPA was to overrule the McCarty
decision thereby allowing state law to
determine whether military pensions
were marital property. Id. at 384, 564
A.2d at 401. In addition, the court examined the legislative history which revealed that the USFSPA was retroactive
and allowed divorce decrees entered
between the date of the McCarty decision and the effective date of the USFSPA
to be reopened. Id.
Furthermore, the court noted that
under Maryland law, as construed in
Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 437
A.2d 883 (1981), pensions, including
military pensions were marital property.
In addition, the Maryland General Assembly had confirmed, as now codified in
the Family Law Article, that a military
pension shall be considered as any other
pension or retirement benefit. Md. Fam.
Law Code Ann. § 8-203(b) (1984).
Pursuant to the USFSPA, the court
found approximately thirty-five state
courts had reopened divorce decrees.
However, these jurisdictions followed
Federal Rule 60(b)(5) and/or 60 (b) (6),
which allowed post-final judgment relief.
317 Md. at 386,564 A.2d at 402. Additionally, it was found that eight states
reserved equity or other broad powers to
reviseafinaljudgment. Id. at 386-87, 564
A.2d at 403. Although the majority of
courts had reopened finalized divorce
derees to permit a former spouse to
share military pension proceeds, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland held that
Maryland law did not allow a Maryland
court to reopen a divorce decree, which
had been enrolled for more than thirty
days, except as provided by Maryland
Rule 2-535. Id. at 387, 564 A.2d at 403.
In support of its decision, the court of
appeals reiterated its earlier decision in
Platt v. Platt, 302 Md. 9, 485 A.2d 250
(1984), where it had held that the trial
court lacked the power to revise a fiveyear-old divorce decree. Andresen 317
Md. at 388, 564 A.2d at 403. In Platt, the
court had emphasized that there was no
authority under Maryland law which
would allow a re-examination of marital

property distribution thirty days after the
decree became enrolled, except for
fraud, mistake, irregularity or clerical
error.ld.
The court recognized that because
there were other states that did not permit trial courts to reopen final divorce
decrees, Congress could not have intended the USFSPA to override state law,
even though Congress clearly intended
USFSPA to be retroactive. Id. at 390-91,
564 A.2d 404-05. Although the legislative
history of the USFSPA disclosed that final
judgments could be reopened, the court
reasoned that this disclosure merely reflected Congress' awareness that the law
in the majority of states allowed a reopening of final judgments. Id. "On the
other hand," the court stated, "there is
nothing in the legislative history demonstrating that Congress intended to
preempt state procedural law setting
forth the grounds for reopening a final
judgment." Id. at 391,564 A.2d at 405.
Despite the USFSPA, military spouses
divorced in Maryland between the period of the McCarty decision, June 26,
1981, and the effective date of the
USFSPA, February 1, 1983, were dealt a
severe blow by the Andresen decision.
According to Maryland law, a court cannot redetermine marital property more
than thirty days after a divorce decree becomes final. Thus, the decision in Andresen demonstrated that nothing short of
fraud, mistake, irregularity, or clerical
error can justifY the reopening of a final
divorce decree.
-Ellen W. Cohill

Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Smith:
MARYlAND'S CAP ON
NONECONOMIC DAMAGES
RENDERED CONSTITUTIONAL IN
WRONGFUL DEAm ACTIONS
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in Potomac Elec. Power Company
v. Smith, 79 Md. App. 591, 558 A.2d 768
(1989), held that Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc.
Code Ann. section 11-108 (1989), a statute placing a cap on noneconomic damages, is constitutional as applied to a
wrongful death action. Although the
Maryland cap was found constitutional
in the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland, the Maryland courts
had not yet addressed the issue.
Fifteen year old Chrisianthia Lambert
was electrocuted by a downed power line
owned and maintained by the Potomac
Electric Power Company ("PEPCO"). The
wire was hanging two or three feet above

a footpath that cut through a PEP CO
right-of-way. PEPCO had knowledge that
the footpath was regularly used by both
adults and children. Prior to the inCident,
the wire had been held up by a cross arm
attached to a utility pole. When one side
of the cross arm snapped off, PEPCO, in
violation of a statute, placed the wire on
the other side of the cross arm. This
second side eventually broke, resulting
in the downed wire. Over a one month
span, PEPCO had been warned on three
separate occasions that the wire was
down; yet, no corrective action was
taken. Lambert was walking along the
footpath when she came in contact with
the downed wire. She died instantly as
7,600 volts of electricity were sent
through her body.
Pursuant to their action for wrongful
death, a jury awarded Lambert's parents,
Doris Smith and George Lambert,
$500,000 in compensatory damages and
$7,500,000 in punitive damages. The
judge then reduced the award of compensatory damages to $350,000, the cap
on noneconomic damages, set by section
11-108(b). Noneconomic damages include pain, suffering, inconvenience,
physical impairment, loss of consortium,
but do not include punitive damages.
Md. Cts. &Jud. Proc. CodeAnn. § 11-108
(1989). Both parents appealed the reduction.
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland began its analysis of the cap by
affirming the trial court's application of
the cap to wrongful death actions. Id. at
623, 558 A.2d at 785. After discussing
the legislative history and purposes of the
statute, the court reasoned that the application effectuates the legislative intent in
alleviating the liability/insurance crisis by
limiting certain damage awards to
$350,000. Id. at 623, 558 A.2d at 784.
'The fact that the cap does not expressly
enumerate the types of personal injury
actions within its ambit is a function of its
breadth, not a limitation of its
application." Id.
The court then turned to the issues of
whether the cap violated various portions of the United States Constitution as
well as the Maryland Declaration of
Rights. Specifically, the parents argued
that the cap violated their rights to a jury
trial, due process and equal protection
under the law. The court, after analyzing
each issue, determined that the statute
did not violate either the Maryland Declaration of Rights or the United States
Constitution.ld. at 625-35, 558 A.2d at

786-96.
The parents contended that the application of the cap "invades the fact-finding
province of the jury by restricting its
ability to determine and fully assess
damages." Id. at 626, 558 A.2d at 786.
The court disagreed, stating that the
wrongful death action is a statutory creation, and, as such, the legislature may
limit and condition awards under such
an action. /d. at 628, 558 A.2d at 787.
Next, the parents contended that a
plaintiff whose recovery is so limited is
denied access to the court and a full
remedy at law because there are no alternative remedies to recover the full
amount of the injury. Id. In dismissing
this claim, the court reasoned that even
with this cap, wrongful death beneficiaries are entitled to a greater remedy than
proVided prior to the enactment of the
statute permitting wrongful death actions. Prior to the enactment of the
wrongful death statute, a beneficiary had
no remedy. Id. at 628, 630, 558 A.2d at
786,788. Therefore, since the legislature
created the remedy then it also could
limit the award. Id.
Finally, the parents argued that because the cap limited an "important personal right," it should be tested underthe
equal protection analysis using the
"heightened review" standard. Id. at 632,
558 A.2d at 789. The court again disagreed, holding that a recovery under a
wrongful death action is not an "important personal right," in that it was only
created twenty years ago. Id. at 635,558
A.2d at 790. Instead, the court determined that the appropriate equal protection analYSis was the rational basis test.
Id. at 632, 558 A.2d at 787. Since the
plaintiffs had not been able to produce
any persuasive evidence that the statute,
as applied, was unreasonable or arbitrary, the statute was held constitutional.
Id. at 635, 558 A.2d at 790.
The court, therefore, concluded that
section 11-108 of the Md. Cts. & Jud.
Proc. Code Ann. is constitutional as applied to a wrongful death action. Id. at
638, 558 A.2d 793. Yet, this is probably
the first of many state tests to challenge
the constitutionality of Maryland's cap.
The holding, however, dealt only with
the cap as applied to a statutorily created
action. Thus, although the court implied
that the cap would be constitutional if
applied to any personal injury action, the
issue has yet to be decided.
-1bomasJ. S. Waxler, III
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